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ABSTRACT
The present investigation concerns itself with the phenomenon 
of natural language phonetic symbolism. Proponents of phonetic sym­
bolism, or the hypothesis of phonetic universals, as it is sometimes 
called, claim that human speech sounds have inherent meaning apart 
from their learned association with referents in the world. Since 
phonetic symbolism had been used to explain both success in guessing 
the meanings of foreign words and also a consistent tendency to 
attribute particular meanings to selected nonlinguistic verbaliza­
tions, it was hypothesized that phonetic symbols were part of an 
underlying stratum of semantic invariance. Further, it was assumed 
that such phonetic/semantic symbols should demonstrate their innate 
and a priori character by being most readily accessible through men­
tal processes that are global, affective and pre-logical. Conse­
quently, it was decided to employ two research strategies which had 
yielded promising results in an earlier study which examined a 
related archaic linguistic phenomenon (Adair 1975).
The first of these strategies makes use of the Jungian typo­
logical notion that persons characterized as high in intuition tend 
to gather data from inner mental processes for the conduct of their 
daily lives. Because of this tendency toward inner consultation, it 
was predicted that high intuiting persons should excel in decoding 
phonetic/semantic units that can be found as archaic, pre-logical 
deposits in all languages. Lesser performance was expected from
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persons who are nonintuitors, since such individuals are assumed to use 
data from immediate sensory experience rather than from inner rumina­
tion. Subjects were selected to represent both extremes of this 
Jungian sensation— intuition dimension on the basis of their perform­
ance on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (1962).
The other research strategy for discriminating logical from pre- 
logical, intuitive processing involved making use of the fact that mon- 
aurally presented stimuli are differentially routed to the cerebral 
hemispheres. The opposite-side hemisphere processes the majority of 
the sound input to an ear. Since the right hemisphere has come to be 
associated with intuitive, aesthetic and global cognition, it was 
thought that stimulus material (i.e., foreign words) presented to this 
hemisphere via the opposite ear would elicit more archaic responses, 
which would have relatively higher congruence with the a priori seman­
tic structure in foreign language words. It was also hypothesized that 
foreign words presented monaurally to the left hemisphere would elicit 
responses relatively less congruent with phonetic/semantic a prioris, 
since this hemisphere specializes in linear, logical and analytic 
processing. Monaural presentation of foreign word stimuli was accom­
plished by blocking one earphone of a headset with acoustically dense 
material.
Response choices were presented to subjects in booklets which 
contained four options per stimulus. These options were arranged such 
that two orthogonal polar opposite pairs would be presented in each 
option set. Randomization of order effects for response choices was 
achieved through application of an incomplete latin square method.
viii
Although the data failed to support the hypotheses outlined 
above, a trend was noted for the intuition— sensation dimension. 
These results are discussed with respect to sex differences in the 
degree of hemisphere specialization and ineffectiveness of the 
dependent variable measure.
ix
INTRODUCTION
Philosophical Precursors
The problem of meaning and the related problem of knowing have 
engendered lively debate in Western Civilization over the centuries. 
When modern linguists and psycholinguists investigate these problems 
within the domains of language and speech, they often cite the Crat- 
ylus of Plato as the most appropriate document to illustrate the long­
standing nature of the debate and the high degree of correspondence 
between twentieth century A.D. and fourth century B.C. articulations 
of the main issues.
The dialogue opens with Hermogenes offering Socrates an invita­
tion to join in the discussion he and Cratylus are having over the cor­
rectness or uniqueness of names. Hermogenes stated that Cratylus 
believes there to be an inherent correctness in names that comes from 
the particular nature of the thing named. Hermogenes espouses the 
radically contrasting view that, names are completely arbitrary and 
interchangeable, such that a new name is no less correct than the one 
it replaces ("just as we change the names of our servants"). Socrates 
is unwilling to adopt either extreme position. On one hand, the arbi­
trary view of Hermogenes fails to appreciate the importance of reflect­
ing the invariance of a thing through an invariance of that which is 
used to represent the thing. On the other hand, Cratylus' impossibly 
high standard for the assignment of names causes him to confuse
1
2identity with representation. Socrates points this out to Cratylus when 
he argues that the goal of the lawgiver is analogous to that of the por­
trait painter; the latter creates an image for the sense of sight, and 
the former, through namegiving, makes an image for the sense of hearing. 
In both instances, the arbitrariness of Hermogenes is absent because of 
the presumed expertise of the image-making artisans. What is necessary 
for Cratylus to grant, however, is that the artisan can be of lesser 
skill at imitating the true nature of a thing without entirely losing 
the representational quality of his production (Fowler 1926).
In another dialogue, The Gorgias, Plato showed how the skill of 
the artisan is a necessary but yet insufficient condition for the 
achievement of human understanding. Gorgias, a sophist rhetorician, 
makes the statement that rhetoric is the queen of all the arts because 
it gives the practitioner the power to enforce his will on society.
In effect, the clever rhetorician has the ability to sway an audience 
of other laymen against the opinions of an expert. Socrates takes a 
particularly low view of rhetoric, calling it no art at all but rather 
a parasitic counterfeit of art. Specifically, it is the counterfeit 
of the art of the judge, who corrects moral disorder and whose stan­
dard is the good. By taking the standard of the pleasant instead of 
the good, the rhetorician can only be a panderer to the body politic 
and never its helper (Lamb 1925). *
In some respects Gorgias' crass opportunism and utilitarianism 
are consequences of his disenchantment with metaphysics. In his essay, 
On Nature and the Non-Existent, he argued that reality is inaccessible 
and unknowable; or, if it is knowable, it is inexpressible and incom­
municable. He rejected the dialectician's method, citing the poor
3reliability of the senses, which are at best restricted to their own 
spheres. To learn through dialectic is to expect speech to transcend 
itself and partake in another realm (Freeman 1953).
Clearly, Plato believed that dialectical discourse is the best 
available means by which to achieve greater precision in meaning and 
better understanding of the good. He shared with the Stoics a belief 
in the kinship between word and meaning. According to Cassirer, the 
Platonic notion is that pure meaning, while not contained in a word, 
is constantly suggested by the word. But because the boundaries of 
words are fluid and flexible, the fixed signification of the cognitive 
concept can only be achieved through dialectical opposition and strug­
gle (Cassirer 1953, p. 75).
Plato attempted a more explicit description of the acquisition 
of meaning through the use of naming in his Seventh Epistle. In it he 
distinguished four stages of knowledge: (1) uttering of the name of an 
idea or concept, (2) explanation or definition of the concept, (3) crea­
tion of an image or model and (A) scientific cognition. Plato's con­
tention was that language is the first beginning of knowledge but that 
it can be nothing more than this because its content is as ephemeral as 
sensory perception. Evidence for the inconstancy of words is drawn from 
the great variety in existing human languages and also from the evidence 
for change of a word's meaning within a given language. Plato seemed 
to be saying that because the phonetic form of the word is subject to 
the vagaries of being in the human situation it is destined to capture 
less of the true content of the idea (eidos) than does the image; schem­
atically, the image can be regarded as holding an intermediate position 
between the word and the true concept. Cassirer noted that Platonic
4idealism considers the things of common experience (i.e., sensuous, con­
crete objects) to be the images of the conceptual system, and it is the 
concreteness of the images that contributes in a mediated fashion toward 
an understanding of the ideal object (Cassirer 1953, p. 125). Given the 
greater transience of words, it is interesting that Plato did want to 
insist that an almost ethereal connection between word and idea exists.
It is this spiritual relationship, this core of meaning, that is unearthed 
in the process of the dialectic. And it is through this agency that the 
idealist philosopher endeavors' to transcend time-binding existence.
In the modern era, philosophical idealism's commitment to the 
exploration of essential, transcendent reality was reaffirmed by 
Immanuel Kant. Writing at the end of the eighteenth century, a period 
of scientific and intellectual upheaval, Kant felt pressed to demon­
strate the noninstantiate, a priori quality of human cognition. In 
answer to skeptics who were abandoning philosophy in favor of solu­
tions from natural science, he asserted that it is fallacious to assume 
that human knowledge is representational of what is real in any absolute 
sense. Kant's corrective to this fallacy required a frank admission 
that all known reality is only that which conforms to human ways of 
knowing. By way of exaggerating this conviction, he wrote "understand­
ing makes nature." The making of nature is accomplished through the 
ordered assimilation of contents from experience. And order is imposed 
by a priori modes of human conceptualizing which channel the external 
world into awareness. These a priori forms are Kant's chief postulates 
for explaining how anything is intelligible or available to conscious­
ness; in effect, these forms are thought to be constitutive of our 
whole experience. Kant used the term appearances to designate all
5external contents of nature which are potential units of human percep­
tion. Kantian theory holds that appearances are susceptible to aware­
ness simply because of the order and form that derive from the human 
mind (Muller 1922). Although he wished to lend credence to the inher­
ent orderliness of human cognition, Kant also sought a revitalization 
of Continental philosophy which would take seriously humanity's sen­
suous experience of the world. He felt that empiricist philosophy's 
surrender to scientism and skepticism was premature, since it had not 
even attempted an investigation of a priori human knowledge. By con­
trast, Continental philosophy was to be faulted for its total emphasis 
on mental representations devoid of sensuous content. Kant described 
general logic as that traditional, formal inquiry that treats relations 
between cognitions without concern for the contents of experience. He 
proposed to supplement general logic with a transcendent logic, i.e., 
a logic which requires the application of a priori forms directly to 
the material content of experience (Fuller 1955).
The transcendental schema was Kant's construct for the medium 
where a priori forms of understanding are joined to sensuous intuitions 
and then assimilated as experience. As the meeting place of sensuous 
content and formal category, the transcendental schema represent Kant's 
attempt to answer the empiricists with respect to the question of 
experimental method. It becomes possible to use the concrete schema 
as the touchstone against which to make comparisons of natural phe­
nomena. The experimental application of a schema can lead to discon- 
firmation and an assertion of separateness from the comparison schema, 
or, alternatively, it can lead to incorporation of some new elements 
from the environment into the existing schema. The latter approach
6engenders greater complexity and a higher level of articulation within 
the comparison schema. In offering this method as an alternative to 
radical empiricism, Kant operationalized his belief that experience 
is a compound of material sense perceptions and formal scientific cate­
gories. The human being is understood to experience actively and to 
form whole percepts out of raw, sensuous matter through application of 
innate formal templates. Kant's credo then is that one's natural 
inclination is to perceive wholes rather than associated fragments 
which have no intrinsic a priori significance.
The whole-making function of Kant's schema was what Cassirer 
emphasized in his description of the phenomenon of symbol formation. 
Cassirer adopted Kant's notion of a priori form and invested it with 
an intrinsic purposiveness which he saw as providing the impetus for 
schema structuring and restructuring. Cassirer saw science as under­
going a continual internal transformation which frequently requires 
the subsumption of inadequate laws into higher order modes of con­
straint. Using the example of biology, Cassirer stated that laws and 
facts which are misleadingly labeled absolute result from a false 
abstraction whereby elements are artifically divided from the organic 
whole of which they are functioning parts. In a more macroscopic 
orientation, each element of a system achieves objective reality in 
so far as one can grasp how it weaves itself into a whole. Moreover, 
that whole takes on meaning because it is a functioning, formal entity 
acting upon the environment in a unique fashion for the benefit of the 
total organism. Clearly, Cassirer saw biology as providing the meta­
phor par excellence of Kant's postulate of the constitutive property 
of forms (Cassirer 1953, p. 29). Addressing himself to expressions
7of human culture, Cassirer saw the same sort of holistic order as exists 
in biological forms. Here again, a set of functional principles were 
seen as providing the constraints which give rise to organic wholes or 
types; these manifest themselves in a constant way in time and space.
It should be emphasized that Cassirer regarded these types as functional 
rather than structural invariants; this suggests that they recur for the 
purpose of systematizing and explaining reality to humans. To this end, 
cultural forms and types are embodied in myth, religion, art and language.
In considering the primacy of cognition versus language, Cassirer 
came to the conclusion that cognition could not lay exclusive claim to 
primacy. In other words, Cassirer conceived language as capable of 
influencing or altering cognition. In his view, this becomes possible 
when the sensory impression of a sound becomes increasingly remote from 
its symbol, causing greater ambiguity but resulting in an enrichment of 
meaning in language. As Cassirer expressed it, "the more the sound 
resembles what it expresses, the more it continues to 'be' the other 
and the less it can signify that other" (Cassirer 1953, p. 189).
Cassirer charted a three-stage progression in the maturation of 
linguistic symbolization. The lowest level is the Mimetic stage, to 
which onomatopoeia and other forms of phonetic sign language belong.
Here the speaker clings to the concrete sensory phenomenon and attempts 
to copy the sound impression as faithfully as possible. The second 
stage, the Analogical, suggests no direct material similarity between 
the meaning and the sound by which it is represented. Rather, a tech­
nical, formal analogy becomes established and is communicated by the 
context of the sound. Elementary examples of this stage might include 
languages that make use of musical tones to differentiate word meanings.
8A more complex analogical example would be that of reduplication, where 
the repetition of a sound can signal a rather subtle change in the 
nuance of a word. In so far as reduplication does not require alter­
ation of the sound, per se, for the communication of a new meaning, it 
represents a transitional phase to true Symbolic representation, the 
highest stage of linguistic development. It is in this final stage 
that abstract symbolization displaces designation and that mimetic and 
alalogic formulae cease to be helpful. Also, it is presumably at this 
stage that language becomes a self-generating symbolic entity because 
of the creative tension that results from the greater distance between 
sound and sense (Cassirer 1953, p. 196).
Cassirer regarded linguistic evolution as a progression away 
from particularism and toward increasing flexibility and modifiability. 
Along with this there is a greater tendency to desubjectivize reality 
and to see things as outside one's self. This occurs when the purely 
expressive, mimetic function of language has been supplanted by more 
analogical and relational functions. Illustrations of spatial partic­
ularism are drawn from Amerindian languages that have no general verb 
for going but instead make use of a variety of terms which indicate 
going down, going up, etc. Languages exhibiting temporal particular­
ity, such as Sotho or Shambala in Africa, do so by generating an enor­
mous variety of tenses which serve more to distinguish the now from the 
not-now than to indicate temporality in the Western sense of past, 
present and future. Cassirer suggested that spatial and temporal par­
ticularity of a language community bespeaks an immediacy and concrete­
ness of cognition that has close kinship to concrete, mimetic repre­
sentation.
9Desubjectivization is accomplished linguistically through the 
establishment of otherness or objectness in the reference environment. 
Cassirer pointed to the use of the definite article as a relatively 
recent innovation whose purpose is to designate the object as outside 
and spatially distinct from the I and here. Several African languages 
which have never evolved the use of the abstract article for distancing 
from the self further demonstrate a lack of desubjectivization through 
a tendency to adopt the human body as a model for relational or prep­
ositional expression. Examples of literal translations of these prep­
ositional concepts include: back or rear end for behind, eye for in 
front of, belly for in. Cassirer cited the development of the concept 
of number as yet another correlate of decentering from the subject.
True numbering permits greater objectivization in the counting and 
assignment of things to classes. Counting and class usage is possible 
only when things lose enough uniqueness for the individual that he feels 
it appropriate to refer to them in a non-nominal, nonparticularistic 
fashion. Even greater objectivization can be realized when the person 
is released from seeing his own bodily digits as necessary references 
for enumeration. In African Sotho, body-bound counting is exemplified 
in the word for five which means literally complete the hand or the 
word for six which means jump, i.e., jump to the other hand. The 
numeric index of desubjectivization suggests that learning to go out­
side one's self is complete only when the physical self is acknowledged 
to be too finite an entity for numbering all but the most immediate 
things in the environment (Cassirer 1953, pp. 207-247). Perhaps 
internalized, abstract counting is resorted to as an accommodation 
to a life style that has long since ceased being one of scarcity
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(e.g., hunter/gatherer subsistence) and has had to reckon with problems 
of storage, accounting and even trade.
In general, then desubjectivization as evidenced in a self­
transcendent approach to space, time and number is highly desirable 
because of its correlation with efficient mastery of the world. In 
language, the higher level of abstraction that accures to looking out­
side one’s self greatly increases the permissible permutations and com­
binations of expressible concepts. In this sense departicularized and 
well differentiated linguistic equipment becomes the vehicle and, occa­
sionally, the motivation for greater concept articulation and delinea­
tion. To the extent that there is a felt need to describe a phenomenon 
with greater precision and objectivity there is higher likelihood of 
witnessing what Cassirer referred to as an interpenetration of forms, 
where the cultural or linguistic forms achieve parity with the forms 
of cognition and are capable of exerting influence over them (Cassirer 
1953, p. 42). Conversely, it would be expected that such mutuality of 
influence would be least manifest in more primitive cultures, in which 
linguistic forms are greatly subordinated to the forms of subjective 
consciousness and cognition.
Highly desubjectivized and differentiated linguistic cultures 
experience a paradox in their attempts to gain verbal control over 
their environment through the use of greater cognitive abstraction. 
Since this abstraction brings with it the freedom to combine symbolic 
forms in novel and highly complex ways, the essential, archaic meaning 
of a word or idea becomes concealed under layers of more recently 
acquired symbols. Cassirer described this phenomenon by reviving 
Kant’s distinction between two types of intellect. The intellectus
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ectypus is that intellect which is totally dependent on images but is 
flexible and articulate in expression. The intellectus archetypus, 
by contrast, is the intuitive intelligence which is elemental and in 
direct contact with the essential idea that emanates from within the 
subject. It is this intuitive intelligence that remains unencumbered 
by extraneous images and symbols and is able to maintain its purity 
of content and transparency. Ironically, it is philosophy's and 
science's task to make use of intellectus ectypus, the discursive 
and richly symbolic form of expression, to work through to the ele­
mental truths of human knowledge. So it is that Western philosophy 
frequently labors at cross purposes with itself by trying to illu­
minate an elemental truth (eidos) through use of the very complex 
symbolic language that tends to conceal that truth (Cassirer 1953, 
p. 113).
The intractable problem of refining elemental truth from 
enshrouding, enigmatic symbolism was addressed by Carl Jung in The 
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Discussing what he saw 
as the growing impoverishment of the symbols of Christian culture, 
he counseled in favor of a forthright avowal of spiritual poverty or 
symbol-lessness rather than an endeavor to regain potency by adopting 
symbols belonging to alien cultures. This was not to deny the reality 
of the eidos or archetypes from which the Christian symbols had derived, 
however. For Jung, the archetypes are empirically verifiable through 
their appearance in primitive and modern societies in widely scattered 
locations. The notions of a priori form and invariance are reasserted 
in Jung's belief that interpretation itself is a resultant of the use 
of primitive and archetypal linguistic matrices. Presumably,
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superfluous interpretive symbols are sloughed off when they prove to be 
incompatible with the invariant, enduring core archetype (Jung 1971, 
p. 32).
Theory and Research in Twentieth 
Century Psychology
The notion that there exist innate, invariant core realities in 
human perception is readily recognized as a tenet of the German school 
of Gestalt Psychology. The doctrine of isomorphism, which was enunciated 
by Wertheimer and Kohler, states that there is a point for point corre­
spondence between the spatial pattern underlying perception and the 
spatial pattern underlying cortical excitation (Boring 1950). This 
correspondence was specified to be topological rather than topographi­
cal, such that the only invariance that is presumed to survive through 
the neural pathway is that of order. Apparently, Wertheimer felt that 
an isomorphic principle stipulated as to process rather than structural 
identity would be less prone to draw charges of simplistic reductionism. 
Other Gestalt theorists seem to have taken a much more concrete view of 
isomorphism and regarded the cortical representation of an event to be 
a truer projection of perceptual experience. Still other Gestalters 
theorized that isomorphism provided for an intercommunication among the 
senses along a variety of descriptive dimensions, e.g., brightness and 
volume. Hornbostel,, for example, expounded a doctrine of the "unity of 
the senses," for which he claimed empirical support in the matching of 
brightness perception across the senses of smell, audition and vision. 
Taking sound symbolism to be a special case of unity within the senses, 
Hornbostel posited six categories (intensity and rhythm, duration, 
pitch movement, pitch of voice, vowel brightness, and characteristics
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of consonants) as relevant determinants for the creation of meaningful 
words. Hornbostel pointed to primitive African languages to justify 
his six category theory of linguistic evolution. That most of these 
languages were melodic or tonal in nature and made use of devices like 
tongue clicks was consistent with Hornbostel's radical position on iso­
morphic perception (Fox 1935).
A pioneering study on phonetic symbolism using meaningless 
sound complexes was done by Usnadze in 1924. He drew six nonsense 
figures and invited his subjects to select most appropriate matches 
for these from among 42 sound complexes. His results are somewhat 
unclear because his report is largely anecdotal and nonstatistical.
He did report, however, that only 29 of the available 42 sounds were 
chosen as matches and that subject agreements as to matches ranged 
from 25 to 45 per cent among the six figures. Usnadze divided the 
kinds of responses given by his subjects into four classes: associa­
tive assimilation, where the sound complex is associated with a famil­
iar word which suggests the object; configurational relationship, in 
which the subject experiences a congruence between the perceived form 
and the sound complex; affective relationship, where the subject expe­
riences an agreement between the feeling aroused by the figure and the 
word chosen for its name; and relationship in mental substructure, 
where the subject reports a "general impression" as the guiding prin­
ciple linking name and figure. The first of these, the associative 
responses, showed significantly less decay when tested on a recognition 
task. By contrast, the nonassociative responses seemed to show less 
decay on something more akin to a free recall task. Usnadze took 
these results to mean that the associative processes of memory are
14
largely superficial and substitutive in character and that this accounted 
for more switching of sound assignments when the associative process was 
invoked (Usnadze 1924).
Wolfgang Kohler gave his version of the principle of linguistic 
isomorphism in a discussion of the correlation between sensory events 
and verbal expression. He argued that the metaphoric and poetic use 
of adjectives in contexts different from their ordinary denotative 
usage is possible because there is a great deal more continuity of 
phenomenal experience across sensory domains than psychology had here­
tofore admitted. Consequently, one is making an accurate subjective 
report to describe a wine as "smooth," an opaque visual image as 
"fuzzy," or an extremely negative emotion as "bitter." Kohler fur­
ther examined his hypothesis of sensory continuity in an anecdotally 
reported experiment where he presented subjects two ambiguous figures, 
one angular and the other rounded. He informed the subjects that one 
of the figures should be assigned the name baluma and the other takete. 
The results of this exercise showed a substantial majority of the sub­
jects choosing baluma for the rounded figure and takete for the angular 
one. Kohler wanted to claim that a process analogous to poetic expres­
sion had been employed in the pairing of figure to nonsense word.
(Both words were Kohler's own creations.) But, whereas the appropri­
ateness of the figurative use of the standard adjective is generally 
quite apparent, e.g., a smooth wine, sweet joy, etc.; explanations for 
the consistent preference of a nonsense word are much more elusive.
It seems very likely that Kohler meant for metaphor to be classed as 
a subset of synesthetic-like experiences that derive from an internal 
unity of the senses. Consequently, baluma (or maluma as it appeared
15
in subsequent replications, in order to avoid association with balloon 
in English) is so named because the correlation between visual and 
physiognomic stimuli makes the name a good fit for a rounded figure 
in some subjective sense (Kohler 1927). Several years later Davis 
(1961) conducted a cross-cultural investigation of Kohler's nonsense 
words and figures. He discovered that the word/figure matching behav­
ior of Tanganyikan school children was comparable to that of their 
English counterparts.
Edward Sapir is given credit for initiating American research 
into the metaphoric and semantic properties of nonlinguistic words and 
also for coining the term phonetic symbolism to refer to the phenomenon 
of intrinsic meaning in speech sound. His study was considerably more 
systematic than Kohler's in that he varied only one vowel of the stim­
ulus items he presented to his subjects. Using an N of 500, he 
instructed his subjects to assign the meaning of a common noun (e.g., 
table) to both members of a pair of CVC trigrams. In every case, pair 
members differed from one another in vowel only, and the subject's 
task was to determine whether a given trigram was a large or small 
representative of the class of objects to which it had been assigned. 
The results revealed a marked consistency to associate largeness with 
the vowel sound a_ and smallness with jL; in terms of Sapir's task, a 
mal was a large table, and a mil was a small one. Different consonants 
were used in other parts of the exercise, and the same vocalic size 
assignment for a_ and ji was obtained. Sapir noted that results were 
much more equivocal in vocalic size assignment for certain vowel 
pairs (e.g., e_ and d^, £ and u) than for others (e.g., jL and £, e and 
a), but he made no rigorous scalar prediction of the size assignment
16
based on his findings. Neither did he feel that his data justified any 
serious hypothesis regarding the causation of phonetic symbolism, 
although he did speculate as to the influence of acoustic and kines­
thetic factors (Sapir 1929).
In a study using over 600 subjects, Newman did a thorough repli­
cation of Sapir's work and attempted to achieve greater precision in 
investigating the order of vowel magnitude symbolism through use of 
scaling techniques that had recently become available. Adopting a 
pair comparison method developed by Thurstone, Newman determined rela­
tive magnitude scale values for eight vowel sounds. He noted that mag­
nitude symbolism seems to follow a mechanical sequence reflecting the 
receding position of the tongue from _i (small) to o^ (large). Corre­
lated with these kinesthetic stimuli are acoustic and visual stimuli 
which relate to vocalic resonance and the increase in the size of the 
oral cavity. Newman compared these results with those obtained when 
subjects were instructed to rate vocalic sounds according to a bright- 
ness/darkness dimension. He concluded that kinesthetic and vowel length 
stimuli are significantly less relevant determinants of brightness sym­
bolism than they are in the case of magnitude symbolism (Newman 1933).
Bentley and Varon challenged the positive findings reported by 
Sapir and Newman in a study which featured free association instead of 
forced choice response. The investigation was intensive in that it 
involved the use of three highly trained observers rather than a large 
number of naive subjects. In their first experiment, Bentley and Varon 
reported that none of the observer responses to their 10 CVC stimuli 
could be construed as suggestive of magnitude symbolism. They implied 
that evidences of magnitude symbolism seen by Sapir and Newman were
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artifacts of the forced choice experimental situation and, hence, were 
not powerful enough to occur spontaneously. Two other experiments 
reported by Bentley and Varon required the observer to answer whether 
a given CVC stimulus had any relation to a particular category (e.g., 
size, angularity, endurance, etc.) that was announced at the time of 
stimulus presentation. This procedure was meant to approximate Sapir's 
but was thought to be an improvement in that participants were permitted 
to respond that no relationship existed between a category and a CVC. 
Under these conditions, roughly half of the observations yielded only 
a "slight relationship" response for all the categories paired with 
CVC's. Bentley and Varon offered this as additional disconfirmation 
of the phonetic symbolism phenomenon (Bentley & Varon 1933).
Two years after Bentley and Varon's study Fox conducted a series 
of experiments to check the anecdotal findings reported by Usnadze, 
Kohler and others. His improvements lay in clear specification of 
stimulus materials (figures and nonsense words) and in general stan­
dardization of experimental procedure. With the exception of one of 
his ten experiments, however, he relied on the use of a small number of 
observers for the collection of his data. His results were consistent 
with previous findings reporting a high level of agreement among 
observers in their matches of figures and sounds. But, whereas 
Usnadze implied a high degree of certainty among observers in their 
assignment of reasons for selection of figure/word matches, Fox found 
no such certainty. Neither did he note the difference that Usnadze 
reported with respect to recall versus recognition memory of associa­
tive and intrinsic matches. Whereas superiority of recognition memory 
for items matched on the basis of intrinsic (nonassociative) cues was
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cited by Usnadze as evidence for the deep cognitive structure of speech 
sounds, no confirmation for this hypothesis is offered by Fox's data 
(Fox 1935).
Irwin and Newland's contribution to this area of research was 
a developmental investigation of the Usnadze matching task. They used 
306 subjects ranging in age from 4 to 18 years and in grade level from 
kindergarten to 12th grade. Irwin and Newland constructed four pairs 
of nonsense figures and an equal number of nonlinguistic words to be 
assigned to these figures. These stimulus items were presented in a 
pilot study to adult subjects in order to determine empirically a stan­
dard (i.e., high frequency) match for each set of figures and words.
The results showed that the grade school subjects performed signifi­
cantly above chance in choosing standard word/figure matches. When 
percentage of standard responses was graphed against either grade 
level or age, a negatively accelerating function was obtained which 
reached maximum at about age 12 or 7th grade. When their subjects 
began to generate spontaneous rationales for their selections, Irwin 
and Newland decided to collect categorical data relating to self- 
reported reasons for word/figure matches. This enabled them to com­
pare their results with those of Fox and, to a lesser extent, Usnadze. 
Interestingly, the percentage of responses falling in the three cate­
gories (association, attribution or general impression) differed radi­
cally from those given in the Fox study. Whereas Fox reported roughly 
a third of his observations falling in the associative classification, 
Irwin and Newland evaluated only five per cent of their selection rea­
sons as associative. The remainder of the observations in the Fox 
study were divided evenly between those who could give no reason for
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their choice and those who cited an intuitive feeling as to the intrin­
sic fitness of the name. By contrast, Irwin and Newland reported 95% 
of their subjects' choices being guided by intrinsic criteria; since 
subjects in this study generated their reasons spontaneously, there 
was no negative impression group to compare with the Fox study. Irwin 
and Newland indicated that associative responses begin to appear only 
after age nine for their subjects. Configurational or Gestalt theo­
rists would find this consistent with their notions of innate pattern­
ing and correspondences among stimuli of various kinds (Irwin & Newland 
1940).
Tsuru (1934) and Tsuru and Fries (1933) initiated a new tech­
nique for investigating phonetic symbolism by implementing words from 
a natural foreign language as stimulus items. It was felt that, while 
the older nonsense word methods developed by Gestalt psychologists had 
the presumed advantage of being acultural and therefore free of bias 
from one's own language, serious weaknesses lay in the very artificial­
ity of the nonsense word situation. Today workers in the area of verbal 
learning realize that many of the assumptions underlying the use of CVC 
trigrams are questionable, e.g., that a random trigram is entirely free 
of meaning. t During the infancy of research into phonetic universals 
there appears to have been less awareness of this problem of control, 
and more attention was addressed to the question of the relevance of 
this kind of research for making inferences about the origin and evolu­
tion of human language. The theoretical approach of Tsuru and others 
holds that phonetic symbolism might be revealed when subjects guess 
the meanings of words from languages which are historically unrelated
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to their own spoken language. In such research it is, of course, vital 
that subjects not have any familiarity with the test language, or pref­
erably, that they be monolingual. Tsuru’s stimulus items were taken 
from Japanese and were rendered into Romanized spelling for visual 
presentation. His subjects, none of whom had any familiarity with 
Japanese, read the transliterated stimulus words and hear them pro­
nounced simultaneously. Each stimulus item consisted of a Japanese 
antonym pair (e.g., hot— cold), and the response options were the 
English translations of these antonyms. Tsuru found that subjects 
could perform significantly above chance level in selecting antonym 
matches (Tsuru 1933).
In reviewing Tsuru's study, Brown raised a criticism regarding 
the possible introduction of experimenter bias, in that Tsuru, himself, 
took responsibility for choosing the Japanese and English antonyms. In 
cases where two or more different Japanese antonym pairs might have 
been acceptable, Brown suggested the possibility of an inadvertent 
choice of stimulus items based on sound similarity as well as transla­
tion equivalence (Brown 1958). Allport replicated the Tsuru study and 
made a methodological modification to rectify the potential bias in the 
original design. He had a native speaker of Hungarian translate Tsuru's
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list of English words into that language, which is not part of the Indo- 
European group to which English belongs. With experimenter bias thus 
removed from the choice of stimulus items, Allport still found subjects 
able to match antonyms beyond chance level (Allport 1935). Yet another 
replication of the Tsuru study was done by Rich for her undergraduate 
honors project. Her experiment made use of Allport’s improvement in 
method by having native speakers do blind translations of her stimulus
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words into Polish and Japanese. Her experimental results were signifi­
cant at the .005 level for both languages (Rich 1953).
Apparently the common institutional affiliation shared by Tsuru, 
Allport, Rich and Brown bore at least partial responsibility for a mod­
erate stimulation of interest in natural language phonetic symbolism 
during the mid 1950's and afterx^ard. Before Brown, Black and Horowitz 
published their results in 1955, three of the four existing natural 
language studies were done as unpublished inhouse projects at Harvard. 
Brown et al. were sufficiently intrigued by this research that they 
designed and executed a replication of Tsuru using the improvements 
introduced by Allport and offering some refinements of their own. They 
employed native speakers to do blind translations of an English antonym 
list into the Czech, Chinese and Hindi languages. Subjects were exposed 
to both aural and visual (transliteration) presentations of the stimulus 
words. The investigators again noted overall significance in favor of 
the phonetic symbolism phenomenon (p <.01). They then did tests of 
significance on each foreign word pair individually and discovered that 
word pairs seemed to differ in their phonetic symbolism potential but 
that roughly half of the pairs reach the .01 level of significance for 
correct symbolism judgment. About one quarter of the judgments were
l
significantly incorrect at that level. In another part of their study, 
Brown et al. attempted to control for the possibility that the expressive 
quality of speakers' voices and not phonetic symbolism influenced sub­
jects' choices. This was done by limiting stimulus presentation to the 
visual mode and comparing these results with visual plus auditory pre­
sentation. Here the number of items for which there were significantly 
correct judgments dropped off markedly, but none of the items registered
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significantly incorrect judgment. It should be mentioned that Brown 
et al. used a great deal fewer subjects in their visual-only study 
(N=16 vs. N=86 in visual plus aural), and this made a rather heavy 
impact on the rigor required for significance.
Noting the generally successful performance of subjects guess­
ing word meanings in Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages, 
these authors concluded that the phonetic universals hypothesis was 
given moderate support. They stated, however, that associationist 
processes taking place in the primordial past could equally well 
account for the phenomenon dubbed phonetic symbolism (Brown et al. 
1955).
Maltzman, Morrisett and Brooks (1956) replicated Brown et al. 
and obtained similar results for their test languages, Japanese and 
Croatian (p <.0001). In the second part,of their experiment these 
investigators introduced an innovation requiring subjects to match 
two sets of foreign words rather than an English word to a foreign 
equivalent. Maltzman et al. believed the latter condition to be a 
more stringent test of the phonetic symbolism hypothesis because the 
intersensory connections or physiognomic speech mechanisms postulated 
by phonetic pniversals theorists should operate even if a subject were 
ignorant of both languages used. Since performance on this task did 
not exceed chance level, Maltzman et al. concluded that phonetic sym­
bolism was disconfirmed.
In an extremely well controlled study, Brackbill and Little 
(1957) looked at different language pairings (English-foreign vs. 
foreign-foreign) and also at differences in mode of presentation of 
stimulus words (auditory alone, visual alone and auditory and visual
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together). They also tried to assure unbiased translation by using 
naive native speakers to provide alternate translations for the 
stimulus words. The task that Brackbill and Little designed for 
their subjects differed from the antonym pair comparisons used by 
Brown et al. and Maltzman et al. in that it required subjects to 
compare two words and to state whether the words meant the same or 
different things. The results of this study seem to place it at 
odds with those reported by both Brown et al. and Maltzman et al. 
First, the comparisons which reached significance were not nearly 
as dramatic as either of the earlier studies. Also, whereas Maltz­
man et al. noted nonsignificant findings for a foreign-foreign 
(Japanese-Croatian) antonym pairing condition, Brackbill and Little 
reported some of their most significant findings in the foreign- 
foreign conditions (Chinese-Japanese and Hebrew-Japanese).
In an effort to reconcile these disparate results, Brown and 
Nuttall (1959) did a synthetic study comparing the methodologies 
employed by Brown et al., Maltzman et al., and Brackbill and Little. 
They again found extremely high significance for the English-foreign 
antonymic pairs task (p <.0001), lowest but still significant prob­
ability for the foreign-foreign antonym task (p <.05), and an inter-
l
mediate significance on the same/different judgment task for the 
English-foreign condition (p <.01). Their conclusion was that the 
phonetic symbolism effect was sensitive to the method of stimulus 
presentation. Citing Sapir's and Newman's studies, both of which 
noted the consistent and seemingly rule-governed magnitude and 
brightness assignments made to certain vowels and consonants, they
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suggested that a person is best able to apply dimensional rules in the 
English-foreign antonym pairs situation. This is because the E-f task 
first informs the subject of the relevant dimension in his native lan­
guage and then permits him to apply the vocalic or consonantal rules 
to the foreign pair that are appropriate for that dimension. By con­
trast, the foreign-foreign antonym pairs situation does not explicitly 
inform the subject of the relevant dimension to decode in the response 
pair, so his judgment should be much less reliable. Brown and Nuttall 
did not expect f-f judgments to be entirely random, however, because 
substantial information is yielded in the two word pairs for the for­
mation of tentative hypotheses (magnitude, brightness, etc.). The 
fact that subjects were able to perform at a significance level of 
.01 in the same/different task was a puzzlement to Brown and Nuttall, 
since there is no opportunity for hypothesis testing in this situation; 
there are no means by which to make relative markings along continua 
using vocalic and consonantal cues.
This slight embarrassment of their theory did not dissuade Brown 
and Nuttall from offering it as an explanation for the superiority of 
E-f antonym subjects over the f-f antonym group. They noted the high 
likelihood that the assignment of phonetic contrast to semantic con­
trast took on survival value for humans and therefore became part of 
the evolutionary history of all languages. Brown and Nuttall found 
the latter explanation preferable to what they regarded as mythic 
theories which relegate the origin of speech to physiognomic repre­
sentation.
One of the most influential theories of the physiognomization 
of speech is that of Heinz Werner (1963). His understanding of how
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an articulation expressed through the locus of the face begins to take 
on meaning involves a two-stage process. First, within the organismic/ 
bodily matrix there is an initial fusion of the person's postural set 
with the verbal form he utters. Then, a differentiation occurs, such 
that the bodily set and the word-form cease to be experienced as a 
unity even though they maintain a correspondence.
This process of increasing differentiation bears a striking 
resemblance to Cassirer's charting of the transition from mimetic to 
symbolic expression. Here, too, one sees the word-form becoming 
increasingly objectified and free-standing outside the speaker. It 
is almost certain, however, that Werner arrived at his two-stage 
theory of language development through application of his more gen­
eral Orthogenetic Principle, which states " . . .  whenever development 
occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of dif­
ferentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation 
and hierarchical integration" (Baldwin 1967).
Werner believed that he witnessed this tendency toward increas­
ing differentiation in a study which superficially appears to be more 
oriented to perception than language development. Werner discovered 
that subjects were able to respond within a general sphere of meaning 
to tachistoscopically presented words even though the precise word 
meanings remained outside awareness. He interpreted this to be an 
example of microgenesis, where there is a gradual unfolding of the 
feeling significance of the word prior to actual recognition.
Further elaborating his notion o'f spheres of meaning in words, 
Werner attempted to explain how it is possible that meanings shift 
from one seemingly similar phoneme set to another. Phonetic patterns—
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and especially physiognomic patterns— constantly arouse a whole array 
of dynamic features from which one can select certain qualities that 
are pertinent to the representation of a referent. This flexibility 
of phoneme forms is a function of the holistic, organizing property of 
the sound complexes of words in which they are found. Hence, the let­
ter o^ takes on a feeling significance of "roundness" in a word like 
swollen but a feeling of "hollowness" in a word like dome. Werner 
tried to capture the multiplicity of phoneme-derived meanings by 
referring to it as plurisignificant, that is, capable of signifying 
a great many referents. The primary determinants or constraints which 
limit the signifying potential of a phoneme are provided by the word- 
form.
Werner suggested that the failure of phonetic symbolism research 
to discover the lawful relationships between phoneme and meaning resulted 
from a lack of appreciation of plurisignificance. Werner held that those 
who sought to establish a one for one correspondence between a particular 
phoneme and an attribute were committing an error knoxm as "the fallacy 
of constant elements." This fallacious assumption guided researchers to 
look for a set of fixed units from which verbal forms are built for the 
conveying oftmeanings. Newman, for example, pored over a thesaurus in 
hopes of finding some justification for lining up all English words sig­
nifying largeness on the _a, £, ui side of the oral cavity continuum and 
all words for smallness on the i. and e^ side. Because all words make 
different semantic requirements of particular phonemes, it would be 
extremely difficult to predict the weighting of a phoneme for magnitude, 
brightness, etc. in a given word. One would need a multivariate proce­
dure and an enormous backlog of empirical data to accomplish this.
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Werner cited the work of his student, Iritani, as an exemplary 
effort to probe the plurisignificance of vehicular material (phonemes). 
Iritani constructed 35 nonlinguistic sound patterns and instructed his 
subjects to give free association responses to each pattern in much the 
same manner as Bentley and Varon and others. In contrast to Bentley 
and Varon, however, Iritani discovered great potential in his sound 
complexes for evoking referents from his subjects. Yet, although many 
associations were generated, few, if any, of these were identical between 
two subjects. Iritani then decided to see whether this superficial 
diversity concealed a set of underlying expressive factors which would 
be susceptible to higher order analysis. To accomplish this, he com­
pared responses across subjects using six dimensional criteria (e.g., 
size, shape, brightness, etc.). His findings from this analysis strongly 
suggested consistency of expressive properties in many of his stimulus 
items. With this encouragement, Iritani did another experiment using 
these same items, but this time he restricted subjects' responses to 
the six dimensional continua he had used in the first experiment. He 
found overwhelming agreement among subjects as to the expressive quality 
of sound patterns according to this continuum marking procedure; in gen­
eral, consensual choices were evoked along more than one dimension. In 
fact, in some cases a sufficient number of similar dimensional fixes 
were evoked to suggest synonymity and antonymity among the sound com­
plexes. For example, it was found that ZECA and TAKI elicited the 
expressive values of smallness, angularity, brightness, motion and hap­
piness; whereas, SALO, VOAG and HULO were linked to largeness, round­
ness, darkness, stasis and sadness (Iritani 1962).
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Other students and associates of Werner became interested in the 
implications of Iritani's findings for further research into nonverbal 
representation of verbal referents. Langer and Rosenberg (1964) 
required subjects drawn from a student population at Clark University 
to produce sounds which could serve as new names for specified spatial 
or color concepts. A random sample of these sound patterns were selected 
and shown to subjects at the University of California at Berkeley. The 
latter group of subjects made matches between sound patterns and spatial 
or color concepts that were in significant agreement with those produced 
by the Clark University subjects.
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Langer, Sampson and Rosenberg (1966) made use of these empirically 
verified phonetic symbols to examine Brown's (1958) critique that experi­
ments supporting theories of natural, nonassociative reference (phonetic 
universals) fail to produce behavioral consequences that are readily gen- 
eralizable. Essentially, this criticism asserts that phonetic symbols 
are little more than experimental artifacts if they do not influence 
other parts of the behaving organism's repertory. Langer, Sampson and 
Rosenberg felt that an adequate test of the natural reference versus 
associationist positions could be made in a paired-associates design.
Pairs were defined to be congruent if subjects from the previous study 
had consistently designated the symbol-referent pairs as matches (e.g., 
ZAH-RED, NERD-GREEN). Noncongruent pairs were those in which a phonetic 
symbol had not been matched with the referent but which was still of the 
same dimension as the referent. Unrelated pairs were those in which the 
symbol had previously evoked an equiproportional distribution of choices 
within the color dimension (of four possibilities) and hence a random 
assignment of referent to symbol was made. These authors hypothesized
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that: (a) pairs of phonetic symbols and congruent referents would be
learned more easily than phonetic symbols paired with noncongruent or 
unrelated referents, (b) more errors would be made with noncongruent 
pairs and that these errors would tend to be congruency errors, i.e., 
response referents chosen previously by the normative group, and (c) 
congruent and noncongruent pairs would be learned more easily than 
unrelated pairs. All of these experimental hypotheses were confirmed.
In an effort to press the issue of behavioral consequences, 
another study was designed by Langer and Rosenberg (1966) which adapted 
the Word Color Interference Test (WCIT) (Stroop 1935) to phonetic sym­
bols. The original WCIT demonstrated that ordinary verbal symbolic 
activity can interfere with task orientation when two modes of sym­
bolic processing are discrepant with one another. Discrepancy was 
induced when subjects were presented a list of color names printed in 
ink colors differing from the printed name; longer latency in naming 
the ink colors was noted in this condition. Langer and Rosenberg's 
innovation was a simple substitution of the phonetic symbol for the 
color name to which it had maximum equivalence. Thus ZAH was used for 
red, NERD for green, etc. The investigators predicted that the phonetic
symbols appearing in print color discrepant with their associated color
\
should evoke the same interference effects as do the noncongruent color 
names. This prediction was borne out by the data. In another part of 
this experiment a replication was done using French subjects and a 
translated form of the Color Phonetic Symbol Test (CPST) , as it became 
called; again, the hypothesized effects appeared.
Langer, Stein and Rosenberg (1969) attempted yet a further demon­
stration of the behavioral consequences of phonetic symbolism by comparing
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results of the two types of color interference tests when administered 
to schizophrenic subjects. It had been noted by Wapner and Krus (1960) 
that schizophrenics evidenced greater interference than normals on the 
WCIT; the interpretation of the differential effects offered by these 
authors suggests lesser competence in schizophrenics for keeping sym­
bols separate from their referents. Langer, Stein and Rosenberg pre­
dicted and obtained parallel differences in interference effects for 
schizophrenics and normals on the CPST.
Two studies by Weiss (1963, 1964) that were carried out prior 
to the work of Langer and his associates offer some perspective to the 
CPST research. Initially, Weiss (1964) asked subjects to attribute 
meanings to phonetically contrasted nonsense syllables by assigning 
them to physically contrasted nonsense pictures. This portion of the 
study yielded matching agreements that did not exceed chance level.
When, however, subjects were asked to match these stimulus pairs with 
physically meaningful referents, there was significant agreement among 
subjects as to referent assignment. Weiss' other study (1963) involved 
a comparison between antonymic and nonantonymic foreign word pairs in a 
matching task with English equivalents. Here he was challenging Brown's 
assertion that performance on phonetic symbolism tasks will be best 
where antonymic pairs are present. His results are equally significant 
for antonyms and nonantonyms. Weiss' interpretation of the data was 
that meaningfulness, per se, rather than the mechanical use of vowel 
or consonant cues h la Brown, was responsible for orienting the subject 
to the appropriate phonetic elements. Langer et al. would argue that it 
is these same critical elements that orient the subject to greater or 
lesser interference in the CPST.
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In the late 1950's Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum developed a device 
to assess the meaningfulness of words and concepts along several attribute 
dimensions. These investigators discovered a high degree of consistency 
in subjects’ assignments of concepts to scale values across a wide and 
varied set of dimension continua. In the course of developing this 
omnibus measure of meaning, Osgood and his coworkers became increasingly 
aware that the chief value of the instrument lay in its capability to 
map out connotative meanings of concepts. Some of these connotative, 
or metaphorical, associations were readily recognizable through their 
continual use in poetry and song, e.g., the greeness of envy or the 
heaviness of sorrow. Other associations had not achieved the familiar­
ity of clichd, and still others would be judged by most people to be 
rather bizarre, e.g., the sweetness of a boulder.
Osgood et al., themselves, engaged in metaphor by conceiving 
meaning to be a three dimensional reality which could be mapped or 
fixed in "semantic space." This model permitted the clustering of 
bipolar dimensions (e.g., hot— cold, nice— awful) into factors for 
higher order analysis of meaning patterns. When this was accomplished, 
Osgood et al. discovered that approximately 70% of the semantic vari­
ance was accounted for by three main factors, those of evaluation, 
potency and activity (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum 1957).
The Semantic Differential, as it became known, generated con­
siderable research examining the merits of cultural univeralist versus 
cultural relativist explanations of semantic origin. A few of these 
studies employed nonlinguistic sound patterns and achieved results 
which offered some corroboration to Weiss' speculations about per­
ceived meaningfulness in nonsense syllables (Birch and Erickson 1958;
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Miron, 1961). Most, however, attempted to use the Differential to test 
the Whorfian hypothesis that cognitive structures result from the con­
straints posed by the syntactic peculiarities of the various languages. 
In general, results were moderately supportive of the alternate view, 
namely that cross-cultural universals of affective and connotative mean­
ing exist. For example, comparisons of American English with Japanese 
and Navajo showed general agreement among these language groups that 
the concept loose connoted hazy, rounded and blunt; light was seen as 
clear and angular; bad was heterogeneous, colorless, thick, dark and 
crooked. Osgood also discovered notable differences in assignment of 
connotative meanings, however. Whereas Anglos regarded blue as thick, 
dark and straight, Japanese subjects found blue to be thin, and Navajos 
tended to associate blue with lightness and crookedness (Osgood 1959).
These nonobvious dimensional consistencies, which Osgood chose 
to see as synaesthetic tendencies, may be part of a semantic domain of 
a higher order than that occupied by the more restrictive denotative 
definition. In this connection, McMurray (1960) noted that percentages 
of agreement among his subjects were no higher— and often lower— when 
the actual denotative meaning was offered in an option pair. McMurray's 
study was an attempt to adapt antonym word pairs used by Brown, Black 
and Horowitz (1955) to analysis through the semantic differential 
method. It will be recalled that Brown et al. was a phonetic symbol­
ism study whose stimulus items were antonym pairs drawn from Czech, 
Chinese and Hindi. McMurray simply required his subjects to choose 
which pair member of a number of bipolar opposites corresponded most 
closely with each pair member belonging to the foreign word stimulus 
list. He again demonstrated the phonetic symbolism effect far beyond
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chance level, but his finding of generally superior subject agreement 
for connotative matches is rather intriguing.
In a more recent study Koriat (1975) built on findings from 
memory research to highlight another theoretical perspective on pho­
netic symbolism. Implicit in many of the previously cited studies is 
the assumption that the cognitive processes employed in phonetic sym­
bolism operate below the level of awareness. Typically, subjects who 
demonstrated either accuracy or consensuality in their matches of 
English to foreign words (McMurray 1960), or in their placement of 
nonsense words on bipolar continua (Weiss 1964) were unable to offer 
rationales for these choices. When reasons were given, there was 
little agreement among persons as to why a particular selection was 
made. Noting that research in recall and recognition memory (Blake 
1973; Murdock 1966; Tulving and Thomson 1971) suggested the existence 
of a phenomenon whereby subjects could predict their performance suc­
cess, Koriat examined the possibility of an analog phenomenon in pho­
netic symbolism. Feeling of knowing (FOK), as it had been called, was 
hypothesized by Koriat to be predictive of one's accuracy in assigning 
foreign equivalents to English stimulus pairs.
When his results confirmed this hypothesized relationship,
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Koriat suggested that both of the divergent camps in phonetic symbol­
ism research would be able to incorporate the finding into their 
respective theories. Nativists in the tradition of Kohler would find 
the notion of intuition-based FOK ratings particularly consonant with 
their view of the innate origins of language. On the other hand, 
Koriat felt that researchers with an associationist orientation (e.g., 
Brown) would be comfortable explaining the correlation between FOK and
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accuracy as a possible indication of how symbolic— but not innate—  
sounds are stored in memory. Presumably, recourse would have to be 
made to a number of mediating memory processes, since it is not imme­
diately apparent how FOK observed in laboratory recognition and recall 
tasks is similar to FOK noted in the matching of foreign words that 
had never been seen before.
Another attempt to probe the nativist position in semantics 
was made by Adair in a dissertation study presented in 1974. His 
chief interest was to test whether archaic, psychodynamically loaded 
meanings of common words would be differentially perceived by subjects 
according to their ability to gain access to cognitive material that 
is ordinarily below awareness. Adair used two separate theoretical 
bases from which to generate hypotheses relating to individual differ­
ences in accessing material that usually is not part of waking con­
sciousness. First, he made use of the Jungian typological expectation 
that persons whose intuitive function predominates in their ordering 
of reality will have more direct contact with the unconscious than will 
persons who interpret the world through their senses. Secondly, he 
cited the work of Kimura (1967), who noted that the cerebral hemi­
spheres in man appear to process cognitive material in different fash­
ions, the left imposing linear, logical and sequential order on input 
but the right employing more global, pre-logical and instinctual 
processing. Accordingly, Adair operationalized differential access 
to below-awareness material in two ways: (1) he hypothesized that 
subjects rated as high intuitors on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(Myers 1962) would generate more archaic contents than subjects rated
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as low intuitors and (2) he predicted that stimulus words presented 
monaurally to the nondominant cerebral hemisphere (via the opposite 
ear) would elicit free association responses of a significantly more 
archaic nature than would stimulus material presented to the dominant 
hemisphere. Both of these manipulations were seen as means to circum­
vent repressive censoring processes that tend to lock human beings into 
the semantic present and thereby block access to the more primitive 
meanings of words in our lexicon. Each subject's free associations 
were judged by three independent, blind raters according to the degree 
of archaic content manifested in response to each of the stimulus items.
The analysis of the results supported Adair's hypotheses. 
Responses of high intuitors were judged to be significantly more 
primitive than those of low intuitors (p <.001); also, responses to 
stimuli introduced to the nondominant hemisphere were rated as more 
archaic in character (p <,05).
The Present Study
There is evidence in the foregoing literature to suggest that 
phonetic symbolism: (1) is a property of the inherent meaningfulness 
of a stimulus array and not primarily the function of a set of con­
tiguity rules, (2) that it is more sensitive to the connotative than 
the denotative aspects of words and word complexes and (3) that sub­
jects associate differing levels of confidence with their choices of 
foreign word matches in phonetic symbolism experiments.
The study done by Adair is meant to explore phenomena differ­
ent from those associated with phonetic universals; yet some elements 
seem to be shared. For example, there is similar use of intuition for
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the purpose of accessing cognitive material that is not in immediate 
awareness. In addition, the Adair paper makes use of an evolutionist 
perspective that is fundamental to nativist phonetic symbolism theo­
rists. In effect, it is possible to conceive of Adair’s experiment as 
a special case of phonetic universals research if one is willing to 
regard the archaic meanings for which he was probing as part of a 
foreign language, namely English as it was spoken prior to, say, the 
sixteenth century.
Following this assumption, a study is proposed here using the 
variables of intuition level and hemispheric presentation to investi­
gate the facility of subjects in a word guessing exercise. It is 
hypothesized that: (1) the combined sample of subjects will give 
correct responses at a level significantly higher than chance, (2) 
subjects rated as high intuitors will be- significantly more correct 
in their choices than will low intuitors and (3) subjects presented 
stimulus words to their nondominant (right) cerebral hemisphere will 
be more correct in their choices than subjects presented stimuli to 
their dominant hemisphere.
\
METHOD
Subj ects
The Intuition-Sensation (N-S) Scale of the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator was completed by 176 right-handed female undergraduates 
drawn from recitation sections of introductory psychology at the 
University of North Dakota. From this subject pool, 52 persons were 
designated to represent the extremes on this dimension; the 26 high 
intuitors who were selected achieved continuous N-S scores of 120 or 
greater, and the 26 low intuitors were those who scored at or below 
70 on the continuous scale. Of these screened subjects, 25 high 
intuitors and 24 low intuitors completed participation in the study.
Rationale
The decision was made to center on natural language phonetic 
symbolism in this investigation. This decision was guided mainly by 
a desire to assess the cross-linguistic, connotative potency of in vivo 
phonemes, i.e., phonemes currently used by a language community.
As has been mentioned, natural language investigations of the 
phonetic universals hypothesis require that the stimulus language be 
one that shares minimal historical basis with the language of the 
research participants. In the present study, it was also thought 
desirable to choose a stimulus language whose etymological deriva­
tion was well documented and available to the lay (i.e., nonlinguist) 
investigator. Hebrew seemed to meet these two main criteria. Strong’s
37
38
Exhaustive Concordance to the Bible is a standard work which charts 
the usage context of a myriad of Hebrew words over the millenia. It 
permits the nonspeaker of Hebrew to discriminate archaic word roots 
from more recent compounds. In addition, owing to the cultural homo­
geneity of the study population, Hebrew was believed to provide a 
sufficiently foreign set of stimuli so as to minimize the likelihood 
that subjects' responses could be based on cognate association.
Procedure
Sixteen stimulus words were chosen from a list of nouns employed 
by Osgood, Miron and May as "qualifier elicitors" in their study, Cross 
Cultural Universals of Affective Meanings (1975). All qualifier elic­
itors were translated into over twenty languages and presented to native 
speakers who were then asked to generate free associates to each of the 
elicitors. In many instances, there was a clear consistency across cul­
tures for certain nouns to call forth a definite, limited group of 
qualifier/adjectives. For example, the word girl elicited pretty from 
40% of the American subjects, beautiful from 27% of the Dari subjects, 
lovely from 38% of the Mexican subjects, etc. Wherever a stimulus noun 
demonstrated this kind of pancultural agreement, the modal adjective 
which it elicited (e.g., pretty, or some variant, for girl) was paired 
with its polar opposite, and this adjective pair was then identified 
with one of the several pancultural factors on which it tended to load 
heavily. In the case of girl, the pretty-ugly dichotomy loads very 
heavily on the evaluative factor, which also includes dimensions like 
good-bad, nice-awful, and magnificent-horrible, etc., across cultures. 
Another inspection of the list of pancultural qualifiers associated
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with girl yields the discovery that almost none of these adjectives 
could be subsumed under Osgood's third major Semantic Differential 
factor, that of activity. To this extent, Osgood's description of the 
factors of the Differential as orthogonal is borne out empirically.
There were two primary criteria for the choice of stimulus 
words. The first of these was a subjective appraisal of the func­
tional primitiveness of the word; it was thought desirable to select 
words for which there would be a high likelihood of regular use, even 
in communities of the distant past. Hence, words like seed, mother, 
fire, death, etc. were selected, and words like policeman were 
excluded. The second criterion was a demonstrated constancy of the 
word form in Hebrew over the millenia; comparisons were made between 
current phonetic representations of the stimulus words and word trans­
literations found in the Strong's Concordance. Only those stimulus 
words showing relative invariance of form over time were kept, and 
special preference was shown for those words with the notation, 
"primitive root," appearing in the Concordance entry.
Each subject's task was to select the most correct English 
response (or match) to a monaurally presented Hebrew stimulus word.
For all stimulus items, the correct response was to be drawn from a 
four option set. In each four option set, there appeared a relevant 
bipolar pair, one member of which was the correct choice, and an irre­
levant bipolar pair. The irrelevant pair was selected through empir­
ical determination of low loading on factors associated with the 
stimulus word. For example, girl seems to show pancultural relevance 
for the evaluative factor (pretty-ugly) and pancultural irrelevance for 
the activity factor (fast-slow). Hence, an option set for the word
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girl might include these four adjectives: (1) pretty, (2) ugly, (3) 
fast, (4) slow. See appendix A for a listing of stimulus words in 
transliterated form and their English equivalents.
Subjects listened to the stimulus material in the language 
laboratory at the University of North Dakota. A casette tape of the 
Hebrew words was prepared with the assistance of a volunteer native 
speaker. A paragraph of instructions preceded the stimulus items on 
the tape and informed the subjects of the general purpose of the 
experiment; they were also told that they would have two opportuni­
ties to hear the stimulus word before making a selection. Monaural 
presentation was accomplished by physically blocking sound in the 
right or left earphone with acoustically dense material; thus, half 
of the subjects experienced right-ear (or predominantly left hemi­
sphere) presentation, and the other half received left-ear, right 
hemisphere stimuli. For every item, the option set was presented on 
an individual page of the response booklet in order to minimize the 
effects of previous and subsequent responses. The booklet appeared 
in four forms, and an incomplete latin square method of randomization 
was used to control for order effects for options. The contents of 
the booklets appear in appendix B. Appendix C contains the paragraph 
of instructions which preceded the stimulus words.
The data was collected during group administrations of the 
taped material on two days, a Monday and a Wednesday. Unfortunately, 
the original tape was misplaced on the Tuesday intervening, and it was 
necessary for the investigator to create a new tape of the stimulus 
items himself. The hazards of experimenter bias were fully recognized,
and attempts were made to correct for these potential differences 
through covariate adjustment.
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RESULTS
A regression analysis of covariance was performed in which dif­
ferences in the voice of the announcer of the stimulus items was used 
as the covariate. Although main effects under consideration in this 
analysis include the variable, response choice order, this variable 
has no theoretical relevance to the study and was included primarily 
for the purpose of control; an incomplete latin square method of ran­
domization yielded four separate response choice orders. The cell 
means, adjusted cell means and cell n's for the other main effects 
are presented in table 1 (hi/lo intuition and right/left hemisphere).
TABLE 1
CELL MEANS AND ADJUSTED CELL MEANS FOR HI/LO INTUITION AND 
RIGHT/LEFT HEMISPHERE INTERACTION
Hi Intuitors Lo Intuitors
N Unadjusted Adjusted N Unadjusted Adjusted
Right
Hemisphere 11 3.364 3.351 13 2.692 2.367
Left
Hemisphere 12 3.500 3.512 14 2.857 2.853
A cursory inspection of this table suggests disconfirmation of 
the first hypothesis relating to overall phonetic symbolism performance, 
since in no condition did the observed or adjusted mean exceed the 
chance expected value of 4.0.
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Table 2 shoxjs a summary of the regression analysis of the data 
using covariate adjustment to correct for voice differences.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE OF SCORES ON PHONETIC SYMBOL TASK
Source
Proportion
of
Variance SS df MS F P
Covariate
voice .081 7.885 1 7.885 4.357 <.05
Treatments
intuition .047 4.582 1 4.582 2.532 .123
hemisphere .001 .116 1 .116 <1 —
response .057 5.546 3 1.849 1.022 —
choice order
Interactions
Covariate
v x i .005 .488 1 .488 <1
v x h .001 .098 1 .098 <1 —
v x r.c.o. .047 4.591 3 1.530 <1 —
Treatments
i x h .003 .293 1 .293 <1
i x r.c.o. .210 20.513 3 6.838 3.776 <.05
h x r.c.o. .010 .977 3 .326 <1 —
i x h x r.CkO. .013 1.270 3 .423 <1 —
Error .519 50.696 28 1.811
As can be seen from the summary table, neither the intuition nor
the hemisphere treatment F-ratios reached significance. Consequently, 
the experimental hypotheses related to these variables receive no sup­
port from the data. It will be noted, however, that the intuition
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effect did reach the level of a marginal trend (p=.123). The covariate 
of voice difference did account for a significant proportion of variance 
in the data (p <.05).
The significant interaction formed between response choice order 
and intuition is difficult to interpret, since the r.c.o. variable was 
included to provide control over order effects. Although no post hoc 
comparisons of means for order groupings were made, an informal inspec­
tion showed that hi intuitors tended to perform best where polar oppo­
site response choices were either adjacent or separated by a polar 
opposite pair (e.g., a. rounded, b. same, c. different, d. angular).
On the other hand, lo intuitors tended to do better where response 
choices alternated (e.g., a. angular, b. different, c. rounded, 
d. same). It is possible that predisposing personality and cognitive 
factors within lo intuiting (or hi sensing) persons cause them to per­
form best in situations of relative symmetry and balance; whereas, hi 
intuiting persons may function better in choice situations of lesser 
symmetry. But even if this is the case, it is of dubious worth to 
speculate on the meaning of such a generality for the present study.
DISCUSSION
Previous research in phonetic symbolism has supported the nativ- 
ist notion that sounds of human speech carry meaning before any associa- 
tionist process is introduced for the purpose of teaching specific lan­
guages (Iritani 1962; Langer and Rosenberg 1966; Weiss 1963; Koriat 
1975). It was felt that many of the Kantian assumptions of semantic 
a priori implicit in this research were shared by Adair's (1975) study 
of archaic word meanings. Adair believed that common English words con­
tained a core of psychodynamically loaded meaning (e.g., sexual or 
aggressive) which had become repressed over the centuries. The word, 
necessity, for example, was hypothesized to have considerable hostile/ 
anal contents for subjects naive as to the word's etymological deriva­
tion. Adair's results provided confirmation for his general hypothesis 
regarding archaic meanings and suggested a methodology that might be 
fruitful in disclosing a priori meaningfulness in words from a language 
totally unknown to experimental subjects. It was reasoned that phonetic 
symbols which are outside one's immediate awareness should be most easily 
retrieved by subjects who have better access to more primitive mental 
processes. In a sense, the present study's goal was to demonstrate 
that Adair's archaic meanings for English words constitute a special 
case of phonetic symbol, namely one that is relatively close to con­
scious awareness because of its position within the language spoken 
by the research subject.
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Some readers may wish to question the legitimacy of assuming 
that the mechanism of repression which is assumed to operate in Adair's 
psychoanalytic conceptualization is the same as the long range evolution­
ary process posited by phonetic symbolism researchers, in which semantic 
universals and a prioris are concealed under centuries of culture over­
lay. It will be recalled that Cassirer's belief was that languages lost 
their elementary symbolic (a priori) quality as they become more prone 
to manipulate abstract ideas and function as the vehicles of cognitive 
novelty. This explanation accounts equally well for the progression of 
the word necessity from earthiness to neutral descriptiveness. In addi­
tion to increasing flexibility in verbal expression, Cassirer would argue 
that this advanced stage of linguistic development offers greater survival 
value to complex modern cultures because the highly subjective and affec­
tive quality of words becomes attenuated. Complex cultures do not use 
prepositions that make reference to the position of the speaker's own 
body. They have replaced nominal with numerical representation and have 
greatly increased their efficiency and commercial potential.
Cassirer would cite enormous differences between primitive and 
complex linguistic communities with respect to their conception of the 
self in relation to significant others (i.e., family, tribe). The per­
son who speaks the language of a complex culture is more likely to see 
himself as a separate being and can therefore approach others as objects 
in their own right rather than extentions of the self. When this is 
achieved, the danger of splitting and viewing the world according to 
the equation, us:them=good:bad, becomes less pronounced as one comes 
to understand persons as possessing positive and negative attributes 
simultaneously. When this level of sophistication is reached,
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boundaries between tribes become more penetrable, providing for greater 
cross-fertilization of ideas and a generally increased awareness of 
reality. Cassirer would maintain that these cultural gains, which 
result in part from the attenuation of the subjective aspect of lan­
guage, are constitutive of western technological society. However, the 
cost that is paid for the advance of linguistic civilization is the 
loss or obscuring of semantic/phonetic deep structure and its compo­
nent a prioris.
Freud (1961) attributed the growth of civilization to the mech­
anism of sublimation, whereby libidinal energy is seen as being detoured 
from its object and channeled into acts of artistic or scientific crea­
tion. It would seem that the repressive process that Adair proposed has 
relatively more in common conceptually with Cassirer's notion in that 
both understand the growth of meaning as progressing from specific and 
subjective/affective reference to more general and neutral reference.
It is conceivable that sublimation through artistic creation and repres­
sion of archaic meaning through evolution of the objective attitude are 
both operative in cultural development. But since the present study 
addressed itself to linguistic phenomena of which Adair's archaic 
meanings are subsets, it was thought appropriate to adapt his research 
strategy to this more general problem.
It was hoped that Jung's Sensation-Intuition dimension as oper­
ationalized on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (1962) would discriminate 
persons able to access semantic a priori (i.e., primitive meanings) that 
are contained in unfamiliar foreign words. It was assumed that persons 
identified as high intuitors should do well at this task since they are 
thought to be oriented towards internal and unconscious processes. By
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contrast, high sensing persons were hypothesized to perform signifi­
cantly below the level of intuiting subjects because high sensation 
presumes that the individual depends on external reality via the five 
senses for information to use in daily cognitive processing.
The Intuition-Sensation Scale of the Myers-Briggs Type Indi­
cator was used to screen subjects from a pool of 176 female introduc­
tory psychology students. A group of between 50 and 60 potential sub­
jects met the inclusion criteria which required a separation of roughly 
two standard deviations on the Intuition-Sensation Scale. Because of 
the exploratory nature of this research it was difficult to decide on 
an optimal sample size for the study, but, since the number of subjects 
generated by this screening closely approximated that used by Adair in 
his study of archaic meanings, there was reason to have some confidence 
in its adequacy. In retrospect, it seems possible that, given the more 
obscure quality of the present study's stimulus materials, a substan­
tially larger N may have been needed for the intuition effect to 
achieve significance.
In keeping with the theoretical approach espoused by Adair, it 
was hypothesized that persons processing monaurally presented stimulus 
words in the right cerebral hemisphere (predominantly) will evidence 
more facility in decoding natural language phonetic symbols than per­
sons processing these stimuli in the left hemisphere. This expectation 
was based on a body of research (Kimura 1973; Kimura, 1967, Ornstein 
1972) which suggests that asymmetry of cognitive function exists between 
the two hemispheres. Further, it has been demonstrated that the right 
hemisphere specializes in global, diffuse, metaphorical thinking that 
is most typically employed in the creation of art or music and is also
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important when making intuitive or synthetic judgments. By contrast, 
the left hemisphere seems to specialize in analytical and logical 
thinking; it is particularly active in quantitative reasoning and 
sequential, step-by-step problem solving. Consequently, it was 
assumed that stimuli introduced into the right hemisphere would 
elicit responses most likely to contain primitive phonetic symbols 
or semantic a prioris.
Some research points to the possibility that sex differences 
may have been partly responsible for the failure of the hemisphere 
effect to appear. Tucker (1975), for example, noted that males 
appeared to show greater right hemisphere specialization than females 
for synthetic visuospatial tasks. If there is a corresponding tend­
ency toward more specialized hemisphere processing in males for audi­
tory stimuli, then the weakness of the effect shown by the female sub­
jects could be explained. Adair used all female Ss in his study and 
he did get significant results favoring right hemisphere processing.
It is interesting to note, however, that the level of significance for 
his hemisphere dimension (p <.05) was much lower than that obtained for 
the intuition variable (p <.001).
The response measure in the present study made use of Osgood, 
Miron and May's (1975) work which attempted to derive pancultural fac­
tors of affective meaning by extensive canvassing of some 26 diverse 
cultures. These researchers asked respondents to make associations to 
a long list of nouns which they called qualifier elicitors. The fact 
that many of these nouns tended to elicit the same adjectives across 
the polled cultures suggested that the orthogonality of meaning
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dimensions already demonstrated for an American sample was robust and 
universal. It was reasoned that the present study might make use of 
these pancultural factors by presenting factor polarities to subjects 
as response options. In this way it was hoped that Ss more in touch 
with archaic contents and meaning a prioris would have a greater "feel­
ing" for the appropriate dichotomy member in a four-option set, i.e., 
that the Hebrew word for fire would elicit hot from the set that would 
also include cold, good and bad.
In retrospect, it appears doubtful that true orthogonality of 
factors can be maintained across cultures with sufficient precision 
and consistency to warrant the assumption that two sets of polar oppo­
sites selected from two orthogonal factors will themselves be orthogonal 
across cultures. Although it may be the case that Osgood and his asso­
ciates have begun to probe deep semantic structure with their pancul­
tural factors, these factors may still be too crude and unrepresenta­
tive of that underlying structure to be used in the manner they were 
here. The fact that several of the loadings for bipolar pairs were 
rather low (.50's and ,60's) lends credence to this criticism.
Ironically, the present study endeavored to improve upon the 
Adair study by adopting a method independent of subjective judgment. 
However, given the difficulties inherent in using an unjustifiably 
reified standard, a system of raters similar to that used by Adair 
may still provide a better source of data for natural language pho­
netic symbolism research. In future research, it might be desirable 
to augment this data set with a performance measure on a task using 
Langer's (1964, 1966) empirically derived color phonetic symbols.
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If performance on the natural language task correlates highly with 
that on the color phonetic symbol task, then support would be given 
to the hypothesis of semantic/phonetic universals.
SUMMARY
The foregoing study attempted to determine whether natural lan­
guage phonetic symbols would be accessible to the general population and, 
further, whether facility at decoding these symbols would be differen­
tially determined by one’s ability to engage in intuitive or archaic 
modes of thinking. The phonetic symbolism hypothesis maintains that 
meaningful units of sound exist in human speech— both in actual extant 
languages and in spoken nonlinguistic words— and that these meaningful 
a prioris constitute a linguistic substrate to which associationist 
processes will subsequently contribute. It was reasoned that phonetic/ 
semantic a prioris should feed into a rather primitive part of human 
cognitive apparatus, since they are not assumed to be governed by 
logical or syntactic processes. Accordingly, means were sought to 
tap this primitive, nonlinear portion of human mentation.
Jungian psychological typology provided one point of departure 
for identifying persons having higher likelihood of accessing primitive 
phonetic/semantic material. Following an approach from a similar 
research problem (Adair 1974), it was hypothesized that persons known 
to have intuition as their predominating function would be most informed 
via unconscious and internal processes and would therefore most readily 
retrieve phonetic symbols as meaningful units. Persons with a pre­
dominating sensing function were thought least able to decode the mean­
ing of phonetic symbols, since such individuals are presumed to be 
informed primarily through their immediate senses.
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Another means of discriminating logical from pre-logical, intui­
tive cognition was suggested in research which discloses an asymmetry of 
function between the two cerebral hemispheres. This research identifies 
the right hemisphere with global, intuitive and aesthetic processes and 
the left with linear, analytic and syntactic cognition. Consequently, 
it was hypothesized that persons receiving auditory input primarily to 
their right hemisphere would demonstrate superiority in decoding primi­
tive phonetic symbols.
None of these experimental hypotheses was confirmed by the data. 
Possible explanations for this are discussed with respect to sex differ­
ences in the degree of hemisphere specialization and ineffectiveness of 
the dependent variable measure.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
TRANSLITERATED HEBREW STIMULUS WORDS AND THEIR
ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS
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TRANSLITERATED HEBREW STIMULUS WORDS AND THEIR
ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS
imma mother
zera seed
shemesh sun
lashon tongue
mayeem water
beitza egg
etz wood
yareach moon
raam thunder
lechem bread
esh fire
pri fruit
maveth death
ba-it house
ruach wind
nachash snake
APPENDIX B
CONTENTS OF STIMULUS BOOKLETS
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CONTENTS OF STIMULUS BOOKLETS
1. i a
ii a
iii a
iv a
. angular 
. different 
. same 
. rounded
b. different 
b. angular 
b. rounded 
b. same
c. rounded 
c. same 
c. angular 
c. different
d. same 
d. rounded 
d. different 
d. angular
For items 2 through 16, 
fashion.
alternate forms were generated in a similar
2. i a. abundant b. easy c. scarce d. difficult
3. i a. burning b. calm c. frozen d. rough
4. i a. bad b. quick c. good d. slow
5. i a. dry b. big c. wet d. little
6. i a. open b. black c. shut d. white
7. i a. weak b. artificial c. strong d. natural
8. i a. rounded b. short c. square d. tall
9. i a. fresh b. quiet c. old d. noisy
10. i a. indespensable b. shallow c. unnecessary d. deep
11. i a. cold b. ugly c. hot d. beautiful
12. i a. fast b. sweet c. slow d. sour
13. i a. slow b . numerous c. fast d. scarce
14. i a. comfortable b. fat c. uncomfortable d. lean
15. i a. clumsy b. fresh c. agile d. suffocating
16. i a. naive b. many c. shrewd d. one
APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
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INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
The exercise in which you are about to participate involves 
listening to words in an unfamiliar foreign language. For each of 
these words you will be asked to try and select a word in English 
that matches the foreign word best. Prior research has shown that 
people can make fairly accurate guesses of foreign word meanings 
under certain conditions.
You will be making your selections in the response booklet 
that has been provided. Note that each page number in your booklet 
corresponds to an item or word number in the exercise. The number 
for each word will be announced in English by a speaker who will 
then pronounce the word itself. A pause will follow during which 
you should try and consider each of the four options appearing on 
the page of the booklet. The speaker will then repeat the word to 
assist you in making your choice. When you have made your choice, 
circle it and turn the page to the next set of options.
Try and base your choice on what "feels" like the most cor­
rect option to you.
Are there any questions?
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